The Workings Of A 16"/50 Caliber Turret

This is a workup to this Friday's Flashback. Three guesses what the topic will be.

Keeping The "Gunfire" In Naval Gunfire Support

The report posted below was written by a LCdr. Mark Kelsey back in 1991. The report basically outlines the history of Naval Gunfire Support and the requirement s needed to maintain a potent gunfire support capability. The report is in some ways dated, but most of it is still applicable today. The first half is a history of naval gunfire support, but the second half if the meat of the report. 

Hat tip to Global Security for the report.

Keeping The "Gunfire" In Naval Gunfire Support

AUTHOR LCdr. Mark C. Kelsey, USN

CSC 1991

SUBJECT AREA - Operations

                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Evolving concepts of the amphibious assault will exploit

capabilities to land forces in relatively unopposed areas from over-

the-horizon (0TH) wherever and whenever possible.  However

circumstances may still require assaults against defended beaches and

landing zones.  In a worst-case combat environment, the seaward

approaches to the objective will be defended by a combination of

surface-to-surface missiles, coastal defense guns, and mines.

    With budget pressures expected to reduce the aircraft carrier

force level to 12 carriers -- and possibly as few as 10 -- in FY-95

and with dramatic reductions in forward-deployed forces, the Naval

Surface Fire Support (NSFS) platforms may be the only supporting arm

available to provide the responsive, close and continuous all-weather

fire support during the early phases of the amphibious assault.

    Unfortunately, the current NSFS inventory cannot satisfy this

requirement.  First, the range of the current 5-inch/54 and 5-inch/38

guns is too short to isolate the beachhead from coastal defense

weapons.  Second, the accuracy of the 5-inch gun is insufficient

against mobile armored forces and hardened point targets.  Finally,

the lethality of the 5-inch gun is inadequate against these same

targets.

    Increases in the present level of NSFS, now at its lowest since

the late l94Os, are necessary.  The technology is available for large

improvements in the very near future.  Just as the "amtrac" provided a

technological answer to a crucial tactical requirement that led to a

strategic victory, so to can the adoption of the imaginative,

practical solutions provided herein, make up for the shortfall in

NSFS.

    But if we are not prepared to pay for fire support on a scale

which is adequate to underwrite success in opposed landings, then we.

should accept squarely that, whatever capability we now possess, it

will no longer be one of power projection ashore.

Ships You Never Knew Existed: Insect-class Gunboats

A class of Royal Navy gunboats built for fighting on the Danube. Also, the Insect-class gunboat the HMS Cockchafer holds the record for Most Awkward Warship Name. 

Replacing The Iowas In The Naval Gunfire Support Role

    Among The Joshua Tress recently posted a photo of the USS Iowa on her way to Los Angeles to her new home as a museum ship. With the retirement of the Iowas, the Navy has lost an invaluable asset that could provide irreplaceable fire support to soldiers on the beaches. 

     The Navy has stated that the Zumwalt-class destroyers will replace the Iowas in the naval gunfire support role. However, the Zumwalt-class is slated to have a production run of three hulls, and is armed with 2 155mm guns. The Zumwalt-class armament is good for gunfire support, but with only 3 hulls, and each one costing 6.3 billion dollars, the Navy will be cautious in deploying them in the littorals close to numerous threats. The Zumwalts are excellent for ASW, and other roles, but they come up short in naval gunfire support.

     What is needed is a class of cheap ships, armed with guns only. A true gunslinger. These classes, would be designed similar to the LCS (Landing Craft, Support) of WWII, which was armed with one 76mm gun, and several 40mm and 20mm cannons. The LCS was developed after the Battle of Tarawa when the Navy was unable to provide support gunfire close to shore. The first new class wold be designated the LCS(X), and would designed to be cheap, fast, relatively expendable, and easily mass produced. The LCS(X) would carry no missiles, no RIM-116 RAMs, no AGM-88 Harpoons, no BGM-109 Tomahawks, no missiles. This would be to: 1) Lower costs, 2) Allow more ammunition storage, and 3) Allow more deck space to be allocated for guns. The LCS(X) would carry one 127mm gun on the bow and stern, one 57mm CIWS aft of the stern 127mm gun and one fore of the bow 127mm gun, as well as 2 more 57mm CIWS amidships similar to the USS Long Beach's 127mm guns. The LCS(X) would also carry at least 2 M242 25mm autocannons, and 4 12.7mm machine guns for point defense.

        This is merely a proposal to provide the Navy with a naval gunfire support capability, that will be able to support amphibious landings. There are a number of other details not covered here that I will discuss on a stand-alone page in the near future.