Showing posts with label DDG-1000. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DDG-1000. Show all posts

Monday, July 1, 2013

Analysis of Alternatives: Zumwalt-class DDGs

     In 2011 The Navy began construction of it's latest class of DDGs, the Zumwalt-class. The mission of the Zumwalt-class is shore bombardment and cruise missile attack, with a little bit of AAW thrown in as well. However, the Zumwalt-class does not have sufficient VLS (80 missile cells) space to provide effective AAW while at the same time carrying the number of Tomahawks needed. At the same time Zumwalt-class has concerns about it's seakeeping capabilities  due to it's tumblehome hull design. The Zumwalt-class will also not be built it large numbers, with a production run of only three ships. Leaving the vast majority of the Navy without any high caliber guns for shore bombardment. Here are what I believe are solid alternatives to the Zumwalts.
     1. Modify Burke-class destroyers under construction and DDGs 85-112 to mount a single Mk 71 8"/55 caliber gun on the bow. The Mk 71 was developed back in the 1970s to fill the growing gap in naval gunfire support, as there were few guns in the Navy larger than 5". The Mk 71 offers improved range over a 155mm gun firing the M795 (27km vs 22.5km) and a larger round (118kg v 46.7kg). Off the shelf is a match for any 155mm gun in U.S. inventory firing any type of ammunition (the only acceptation being the LRLAP round).
     I would argue that the Mk 71 is better than the AGS because the AGS has no anti-ship capability, and fires only one round, the LRLAP. With only a small amount of LRLAPs being purchased for only 6  operation guns (3 Zumwalts, 2 guns apiece), the cost per round will be abnormally high. To sum it up, I'd like to quote ComNavOps over at Navy Matters.

  • Cost – when the Navy committed to the AGS the Mk71 development costs were already long since paid for.  The gun was essentially free and a prototype had already been successfully tested.  Advanced rounds, if desired, would have entailed additional costs just as for the AGS.
  • Explosive Power – the 8” round is so much more effective than a 6”.
  • Shipboard Impact – the AGS, as we’ve discussed has a major impact on ship design and ship utilities.  The Mk71 is a simple gun and easily accommodated.
  • Flexibility – the Mk71 is a general purpose gun capable of engaging both ship and shore targets unlike the AGS which has no anti-ship mode.

Since it is almost impossible to cancel the Zumwalts at this point, it would be best to cancel the AGS and LRLAP, and mount Mk 71s in lieu of AGSs on the Zumwalt-class. They will provide the Zumwalt-class with a WVR anti-ship capability and an improved naval gunfire support capability at a lower cost.
     2. New class of AAW and land attack ships built around large numbers VLS cells and the AMDR.  This is basically the Arsenal ship concept, a stretched Tico hull (Long Beach size) with an increased number of VLS cells, a nuclear power plant, and an Air and Missile Defense Radar. Remove the helipad, aviation facilities, 5" guns, torpedo tubes, and ASW suite. This would make room for 8-10 more Mk 41 VLSs, yielding a magazine increase of 481-610 missiles. The sole mission of this ship would be to provide anti-air coverage for carriers, and BMD and land attack support for amphibious assaults. The Zumwalt-class has a smaller VLS capacity than the Ticos (80 vs. 122), and yet it is expected to contribute in AAW while at the same launching TLAMs in support of amphibious assaults. This leads to a compromise and a loss of capability in the area of AAW which will be pivotal in any amphibious assaults.
      I do not believe that the Zumwalt-class is the right choice for the Navy in light of cost overruns and continued delays. Each mission (naval gunfire support, land attack, and AAW) that the Zumwalt-class is meant to perform requires vastly different capabilities, with AAW and land attack requiring large numbers of VLS cells which will deny space to needed guns for naval gunfire support. It would be more effective to build a class of ships meant entirely for missile warfare (AAW and land attack), while modifying existing and future destroyers to carry the Mk 71 to provide more effective naval gunfire support.















Monday, June 4, 2012

Replacing The Iowas In The Naval Gunfire Support Role

    Among The Joshua Tress recently posted a photo of the USS Iowa on her way to Los Angeles to her new home as a museum ship. With the retirement of the Iowas, the Navy has lost an invaluable asset that could provide irreplaceable fire support to soldiers on the beaches. 
     The Navy has stated that the Zumwalt-class destroyers will replace the Iowas in the naval gunfire support role. However, the Zumwalt-class is slated to have a production run of three hulls, and is armed with 2 155mm guns. The Zumwalt-class armament is good for gunfire support, but with only 3 hulls, and each one costing 6.3 billion dollars, the Navy will be cautious in deploying them in the littorals close to numerous threats. The Zumwalts are excellent for ASW, and other roles, but they come up short in naval gunfire support.
     What is needed is a class of cheap ships, armed with guns only. A true gunslinger. These classes, would be designed similar to the LCS (Landing Craft, Support) of WWII, which was armed with one 76mm gun, and several 40mm and 20mm cannons. The LCS was developed after the Battle of Tarawa when the Navy was unable to provide support gunfire close to shore. The first new class wold be designated the LCS(X), and would designed to be cheap, fast, relatively expendable, and easily mass produced. The LCS(X) would carry no missiles, no RIM-116 RAMs, no AGM-88 Harpoons, no BGM-109 Tomahawks, no missiles. This would be to: 1) Lower costs, 2) Allow more ammunition storage, and 3) Allow more deck space to be allocated for guns. The LCS(X) would carry one 127mm gun on the bow and stern, one 57mm CIWS aft of the stern 127mm gun and one fore of the bow 127mm gun, as well as 2 more 57mm CIWS amidships similar to the USS Long Beach's 127mm guns. The LCS(X) would also carry at least 2 M242 25mm autocannons, and 4 12.7mm machine guns for point defense.
        This is merely a proposal to provide the Navy with a naval gunfire support capability, that will be able to support amphibious landings. There are a number of other details not covered here that I will discuss on a stand-alone page in the near future. 

Monday, March 12, 2012

A Strategy For The 21st Century, Part 7: The Navy

     The Navy. This service among all 5 is probably the most important not only from a war fighting point of view, but in terms of foreign policy. However, the Navy has made a number of grave errors in recent history which must be fixed.
     1. Cancel the Littoral Combat Ship. Between 2004 and 2011, the Navy ran a contest between General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin for a contract to develop the Littoral Combat Ship. Basically, the LCS is meant to get in the shallows and chase down pirates and other hostiles, hunt mines, and hunt subs. In 2011 the Navy asked Congress purchase both designs, this has since been approved. The price for a single LCS is about 450 million dollars. The LCS also uses "modules" for specialized tasks like ASW, whcih can switched out for other modules to handle other tasks. However, as of 2011 not one of the "modules" supposed to be used in the LCS has become operational. At the same time the missile meant to be used by the LCS, the XM501 has been canceled, which takes away a good deal of the LCS's firepower. At the same time Huntington Ingalls has produced a frigate design based of the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter, called  "Patrol Frigate 4921". This design offers several advantages over the LCS, better handling in heavy seas, longer range, slightly heavier armor (armor does matter in the littorals), greater firepower. All that is required is upgrading the radar and electronics to Naval standards, upgunning the 57mm cannon to a 76.2mm or a 127mm gun, adding several 25mm chain guns for close in fighting, and the addition of a towed sonar array.                                       
     2. Cancel the Zumwalts. Another Navy boondoggle is the Zumwalt-class of destroyers. The Zumwalt-class have an emphasis on land attack, while at the same time handling the duties of a regular destroyer. Originally, there were supposed to be 32 Zumwalts, as of 2012 there will only be 3 Zumwalts built. On top of this the Navy has stated that they no longer want the Zumwalts, and they would rather have more Arleigh Burkes. Also, in this instance quantity over quality should be the mantra, because destroyers are exponentially more valuable. Thus, the loss of one not as capable destroyer of which there are many, would not be felt as much as the loss of an extremely capable destroyer of which there are few. The cost of a single Zumwalt is 3 billion dollars, at the same time 5 Arleigh Burkes can be purchased for the same amount. There are also concerns that even though the Zumwalt is equipped for the land attack role, it will be unable to fufill it's duties as it pertains to naval fire support. In this instance the solution would be simply to purchase more Arleigh Burkes rather than the Zumwalt-class.
     4. During the Cold War the U.S. was the best in the world at anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and had the best sub force in the world. However, since the  so-called "Peace Dividend"  sub force hgas dropped from 93 SSNs and 33 SSBNs, to 53 SSNs, and 14 SSBNs in 2011 (this does not include 4 SSBNs converted to SSGNs.). Some of these cuts are understandable, as the collapse of the Soviet Union there was not as great a need for a large sub fleet. However, with the rise of the PRC there is need for more subs, as carriers and surface warships might not be able to get close to Asia because of ASBM and cruise missile threats. Same goes for the Navy's ASW capability, at the end of the Cold War, American ASW crews were the best, however the skills which were honed by hunting Soviet subs in the North Atlantic have deteriorated with a lack of emphasis on the sub threat. 
     This is just a beginning on the road to rebuilding the Navy, there need to changes in the way the Navy selects it flag officers and makes promotions, naval aviation, women on subs and carriers, and the SEALs. But what is stated above, is an excellent start to rebuilding the Navy.